Development of collaborative spirit indices: The case of South Korea’s maritime industry

Chang-Soo Kim, Saeyeon Roh, Young-Joon Seo

Department of International Trade, Pusan National University, South Korea
Plymouth Business School, University of Plymouth, United Kingdom
School of Economics & Trade, Kyungpook National University, South Korea

Abstract

This study aims to evaluate the extent of collaboration between shippers and shipping companies in South Korea. Bespoke cooperative and collaborative spirit indices (CCSIs) reflect the conceptual differentiation between cooperation and collaboration, as well as a more comprehensive conceptualisation. Shipping companies registered in South Korea returned 167 usable responses. CCSIs were developed through exploratory factor analysis weighting methods, and differences among CCSIs by vessel type and contract period were examined using multivariate analysis of variance. CCSIs indicate that powerful supply chain members resist two-way communication, mutuality, distributive fairness, and long-term relationships. This is one of the first studies to operationalise the key concepts of cooperation and collaboration in terms of the maritime industry, providing the basis for future research in other supply chains despite a single informant attribute. Based on the CCSI scores, managerial and political initiatives are discussed to reduce barriers to interaction and ameliorate the CCSI level between supply chain members. The research provides insights into the extent of cooperation and collaboration by initially establishing CCSIs in the maritime industry, which will support strategic approaches to supply chain members.

Keywords: Cooperation, Collaboration, Marine transport, Empirical study, South Korea

1. Introduction

Supply chain management (SCM) improves customer service and competitiveness by combining inter-firm cooperation and inter-functional coordination of major business processes (Min & Mentzer, 2004). Supply chain (SC) competitiveness is predicated on supply chain collaboration (SCC); however, despite numerous definitions, cooperation is rarely differentiated from collaboration (Hudnurkar, Jakhar, & Rathod, 2014; Thomson, Perry, & Miller, 2009). Piecemeal research has hampere...
companies. Most SC members that require shipping logistics services can function as shippers (Fransoo & Lee, 2013; Frémont, 2009).

As the global economy becomes more open through the World Trade Organization (WTO) and free trade agreements (FTAs), the shipping industry repeatedly undergoes periodic crises similar to the repetitive cycle of the global financial crisis. Global container carriers have struggled to survive the ordeal caused by a sluggish economy and overcapacity since the crisis, and the current shipping environment features complexity and unpredictability (Kamal, Kara, & Olgay, 2021; Kuo, Lin, & Lu, 2017).

In terms of the relationship between shippers and logistics companies, excluding a few exceptional cases such as the recent COVID-19 pandemic, shippers have had a dominant advantage over shipping lines during most shipping cycles, which have reduced from 14.9 years to 8 years over the last 22 cycles (Stopford, 2009). As buyers (shippers) can easily change suppliers (shipping companies) in highly competitive industries such as logistics, customers (shipper) are typically regarded as having more power in supplier-customer relationships (Golicic, 2007). Liner shipping companies confront powerful shippers, such as multinational corporations, and powerful shippers tend to severely reduce their budget for transport (Stopford, 2009). Midoro, Musso, and Parola (2005) also note that shippers’ contractual power has increased under the imbalance between supply and demand as well as fierce competition in container shipping in the following ways. The globalisation of manufacturers has meant that carriers have had to cope with new demands from shipping lines to deliver goodsglobally and face chronic fleet overcapacity on the supply side. Shipping companies have had to cope with the increased costs arising from providing globalised services: the entrance into shipping markets of new carriers has heightened competition in shipping markets globally (Slack, Comtois, & McCalla, 2002). In this vein, the main carriers had to adopt a strategy enhancing economies of scale such as increase of vessel size and mergers and acquisitions because of the extreme difficulty in maintaining stable freight rates in a considerably competitive business environment (Midoro et al., 2005). In other words, economies of scale have created pressures to fill ships with freight, and shipping lines subsequently had to accept whatever price the shipping market provides and have emphasised cost reduction (Noteboom, Rodrigue, & De Monie, 2016).

Simultaneously, the carriers have sought new forms of cooperation, such as global alliances, which are different from former conferences and consortia (Midoro et al., 2005). It is generally agreed that globalisation and competition have affected a type of grouping among shipping lines (Slack et al., 2002). The alliances make carriers accentuate a price advantage rather than adopting a differentiation strategy for their services and capabilities (Maloni, Gilgör, & Lagoudis, 2016). Outperforming their competitors by overcapacity has caused fierce competition and reduced profitability, which has had a destructive effect on the recovery of shipping markets (Kou & Luo, 2016). In this regard, many authors have addressed the cooperation and competition between parties related to ocean transportation.

Typically, as shipping companies offer easily duplicated services and are revenue-reliant on powerful shippers, adversarial relationships are universally known to exist between the two (Golicic, 2007; Heaver, 2015). Meanwhile, even when shippers predominate, logistics companies must create and maintain cooperative and collaborative relationships with shippers to outline. The shipping firm’s survival in the languishing economy plagued by overcapacity may depend on shippers’ willingness to guarantee reasonable profits, sharing additional costs, and long-term contracts. Conversely, a cooperative and collaborative spirit also benefits shippers, consumers of logistics services dependent on carriers’ tariffs, by ensuring that more carriers offer high-quality, cost-effective delivery systems (Talley & Ng, 2013). Facing unfettered competition, risks, and uncertainties caused by globalisation, as a way of balancing self-interests with interdependency to improve overall performance, dominant partners have adopted strategies such as collaboration, better visibility, reliability, and agility (Heaver, 2015; Richey, Roath, Whipple, & Fawcett, 2010).

In this context, this paper aims to reveal the extent of cooperation and collaboration in SC using cooperative and collaborative spirit indices (CCSIs) to assist policymaking in South Korea’s maritime industry. Addressing the research gap in SC cooperation and collaboration, this South Korean case study presents CCSIs to quantify relationships between shippers and shipping companies.

Generally, an index presents an intuitive and well-defined understanding of a situation or state. It might be possible to measure and compare changes in the index over time and among countries when a credible and trustworthy index is developed. To date, many indices have been developed by international organisations, such as the Logistics Performance Index (LPI) by the World Bank, Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) by the Global Competitiveness Forum, and Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) by Transparency International.

Regarding collaboration indices, Simatupang and Sridharan (2005) introduced a collaboration index to measure the level of collaborative practices between retailers and their suppliers. The index measures collaborative practice based on decision synchronisation, information sharing, and incentive alignment using the mean score of the three dimensions in the sample (Simatupang & Sridharan, 2005). Supply chain collaboration index (SCCI) was introduced by Kumar, Banerjee, and R (2014). Six dimensions were used to conceptualise an instrument for measuring SCC and calculate SCC: joint planning for increasing market share, executing schedule, problem-solving and performance measurement, sharing of operational resources, market-based information, and collaborative culture. Relevant data were collected from SC members in diverse industries, and the instrument was tested with partial least squares methods. However, the abovementioned studies were not relevant to the maritime context and did not comprehensively and synthetically examine collaboration.

Therefore, this study intends to examine a methodology that measures the overall level of cooperation and collaboration in an SC comprising shipping companies and shippers as a case study of collaboration in SCs. Furthermore, through the development of CCSIs, this research also attempts to provide criteria to test whether cooperation and collaboration between the parties exist and diagnose the current state of cooperation and collaboration.

2. Literature review

2.1. Theories underlying cooperation and collaboration

The transaction cost theory (TCT) argues that transaction costs shape governance structures, markets, and hierarchies; however, when markets fail, researchers focus on relational governance and alliances rather than on hierarchy (Geyskens, Steenkamp, & Kumar, 2006). Recent theoretical extensions predict cooperation and collaboration as necessary alternatives to transactions (Kim, Park, Ryoo, & Park, 2010). Transactions governance spans spot markets, hierarchies, and long-term hybrid contracts, all of which are relevant to SCM (Williamson, 2008). Surrounding constrained rationality, securing economic efficiency, and realising transaction stability from opportunistic threats can be achieved through inter-firm cooperation (Kim et al., 2010).

Further, the resource-based theory (RBT) characterises a firm as comprising different resources or a resource bundle and studies their impact on performance (Barney, 1991; Hsu, Han, & Prajogo, 2016). Capabilities are treated as the origin of competitive advantage in RBT, which also emphasises intra-firm resources (Dyer & Singh,
1998). Assembling, cooperation, and resource co-ordination—including inter-firm resources—signify capabilities that yield greater productivity and better performance (Huo et al., 2016). The relational theory (RT) complements the RBT (Dyer & Singh, 1998), as it involves ‘the application of RBT to inter-organisational relations’ (Acedo, Barroso, & Galan, 2006, p. 625). The RBT traces the origin of competitive advantage from intra-firm resources, whereas RT emphasises that competitive advantage can be acquired through inter-firm dyads or networks (Dyer & Singh, 1998). The underlying cooperation and collaboration theory can be derived from RBT if resources, particularly intangible resources or capabilities, could extend to embrace the collaborative and cooperative relationship network. Arguably, the RBT might assist in framing complex dimensions of SC relationships that involve new product development and process issues therein (Ahmed, Kristal, Pagell, & Gattiker, 2017). Attempts to secure necessary resources from the market arise because trials to obtain all resources within a firm fail, thereby necessitating bilateral relationships. As with RBT, resource dependence theory (RDT) advocates SCC to improve performance and respond to market demand (Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009). However, gaining access to inter-firm resources involves a loss of autonomy, and dependency must be avoided, if possible.

Further, social exchange theory (SET) explores how costs and rewards influence actors’ interactions in an exchange process, and the difference determines attitudes and behaviours (Griffith, Harvey, & Lusch, 2006). Comparing rewards and costs of an exchange, actors tend to participate in and create relationships to maximise benefits and minimise costs (Nunkoo & Ramkissoon, 2012). In SET, power, commitment, justice, and trust are vital (Morgan & Hunt, 1994).

The social capital theory (SCT) concerns others’ ‘goodwill’ that encourages cooperative behaviour and allows new forms of association and organisation to develop (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Putnam, 1993). High levels of trust, particularly in networks, reduce economic transaction costs and the scope for opportunism and expensive monitoring processes (Putnam, 1993). Actors can utilise social capital as a resource, offering competitive advantages (Adler & Kwon, 2002).

2.2. Cooperation and collaboration in SCM and logistics

Occasionally, cooperation between distributors and manufacturers precedes trust (Anderson & Narus, 1990); however, long-term relationships built on trust and dependence can be found in the case of retail buyer and vendor relationships (Ganesan, 1994). Morgan and Hunt (1994) studied the antecedents and consequences of trust and commitment between tyre retailers and suppliers. Furthermore, the trust and commitment between customers/buyers and service personnel/providers/sellers are represented as ‘relationship strength’, with information and cooperation as antecedents (Bove & Johnson, 2001). Barratt (2004) identifies openness/communication, mutuality, trust, and information exchange as components of collaborative culture. In parallel with information sharing, Min et al. (2005) include joint planning, joint problem-solving and performance measurement, and leveraging resources and skills to characterise SCC.

Procedural and incentive alignment also positively influence the long-term SC relationship between suppliers and distributors (Griffith et al., 2006). Kim et al. (2010) identify the determinants of cooperation, including technical uncertainty, reciprocity, and trust in the relationships between telecommunication service providers and suppliers. Common knowledge creation and collaborative communication, in addition to information sharing, determine the components of SCC (Cao & Zhang, 2011). Trust and commitment follow quality, information sharing, and availability (Chen, Ye, Rajkumar, & Tomochko, 2011). SCC is also linked with execution, planning collaboratively, and decision-making. Collaborative practices such as incentive alignment, decision synchronisation, and information sharing are implemented by applying a collaboration index using Likert scales to estimate the mean scores for each dimension (Simatupang & Sridharan, 2005). Kumar et al. (2014) analysed six dimensions of an SCC index using partial least squares analysis. Along with intra-organisational motivations, Pradabwong, Braziotis, Tannock, and Pawar (2017) confirm shared common goals and information, incentive alignment, joint activities, and information communication as inter-organisational antecedents of SCC to enhance marketplace competitiveness.

Components of win/win partnerships include long-term anticipation, loyalty, and shared benefits and burdens between shippers and carriers, forming ‘relationship extendedness’ (Gardner, Cooper, & Noordewier, 1994). The readiness of carriers to commit their assets to shippers is influenced by trust, mutual reliance, and communication (Zsidisin et al., 2007). Using SEM to test the ‘relationship strength’, Golobic (2007) finds that trust and commitment show a significant difference between shippers and carriers. Fugate et al. (2009) find that environmental changes and capacity constraints, such as regulated driving hours, triggered a better balance of power between shippers and inland carriers, thereby culminating in collaborative relationships. Nassimia and Robinson (2013) case study of maritime coal SCs reveals that cooperation and integration maximise benefits and SCC value increments.

Within maritime logistics, knowledge creation, decision coherence, information sharing, joint SC performance measurement, and goal-like ness can be measured for SCC (Seo, Dinwoodie, & Roh et al., 2015). Competition and globalisation foster widespread collaboration to increase efficiency, which supersedes traditional hostility within the port industry (Heaver, 2015; Seo, Dinwoodie, & Roe, 2016, 2015).

3. Conceptual framework

3.1. Differentiation between cooperation and collaboration and their operational definitions

Most SCM literature defines SCC in different ways and does not differentiate between collaboration and cooperation (Hudnurkar et al., 2014). Differences between collaboration and cooperation relate to the extent of trust, commitment, and mutual reliance; cooperation is lacking in trust and less active than in collaboration (Golicic, Foggin, & Mentzer, 2003). Cooperation is an emergent relationship that involves limited information exchange or advertising of long-term contracts; the transition to collaboration involves free information sharing, solving common problems, and joint planning for the future (Spekman, Kamauff, & Myhr, 1998). Compared to cooperation, collaboration includes higher levels of trust and commitment (Spekman et al., 1998). Among the two concepts, the extent of trust and commitment is discriminated against, and thus, cooperation can be incorporated within the collaboration. Therefore, cooperation can be postulated as a subset of collaboration (Kim, Dinwoodie, & Seo, 2018). In the maritime context, shipping lines settle contracts in various terms, such as temporary, cooperative, or collaborative partnerships with shippers. The types of partnerships can be differentiated depending on the extent of trust and sustainability. Temporary partnerships can be regarded as open market negotiation relationships (Spekman et al., 1998), where shippers are treated as mere customers through spot contracts. The characteristics of cooperation, such as information and resource sharing and financial support, appear when this contract repeats continuously. Cooperative relationships gradually build business trust and develop new projects and contracts to new markets. Eventually, in terms of relationships with shippers, the long-term relationship based on cooperation evolves into collaborative relationships in the future in the maritime sector.
Therefore, in this study, cooperation is considered a business partnership process between shippers and shipping companies with transparency where they work together as partners and treat each other in an equal manner, based on mutuality, for common goals and advantages. Collaboration refers to a business partnership process between shippers and shipping companies, where long-term sustainable cooperative relationships are the main objective among the partners based on mutual trust (Kim et al., 2018). Coordination is not differentiated from cooperation because coordination simply implies cooperation (Morgan & Hunt, 1994).

3.2. Components of collaboration

Through an extensive literature review of cooperation and collaboration, this study postulates that collaboration between shippers and shipping companies comprises cooperation and ‘extended relationship strength’. Cooperation is considered to comprise transparency, fairness, and mutuality in the relationship between the two parties. Regarding ‘extended relationship strength’, relationship strength embraces trust and commitment (Bove & Johnson, 2001), and ‘relationship extendedness’ includes loyalty and long-term expectations (Gardner et al., 1994). Based on the trust between the shipper and shipping lines, business relationship sustainability increases as commitment (loyalty) and long-term orientation bond stronger. Therefore, this study views ‘extended relationship strength’ as constructed by sustainability and ‘trust’ between shippers and shipping line business relationships. Out of the extensive literature, 76 items were compiled for five components of collaboration.

3.2.1. Components of cooperation

3.2.1.1. Transparency. Clear establishment of the relationship, including shared information and straightforward communication through advance agreement for open and transparent relationships with one another, can be taken as transparency. Thus, it can be considered that information sharing, communication, and formalisation compose transparency (Kim et al., 2018). A primary form of collaboration—a critical component of cooperation in SCM—is information sharing. Private data exchange among partners requires the establishment of an efficient SC (Kumar et al., 2014). A lack of willingness to share appropriate information makes the establishment of SC relationships strenuous (Richey et al., 2010). Conversely, better decision-making and an efficient SC can be achieved through detailed information exchange, thereby providing SC visibility (Min et al., 2005).

The identification of opportunities and requirements for improvement is the main purpose of communication (Min et al., 2005). Collaborative communication refers to the inter-communication procedure between SC members in terms of frequency, means, direction, and influence strategy (Cao et al., 2010). It is two-way directional communication with more frequency and better information modes that enhance indirect influences (Mohr & Nevin, 1990). Formalisation involves clear-cut rules and procedures that regulate the decision-making process (Dwyer & Oh, 1987). As formalisation is higher, the decisions and working relationships are more influenced by formal standardised policies and rules for longer periods. By removing vagueness and elucidating priorities, formalisation forms the expectations of necessary objectives and sets up standard practices, thereby enhancing transparency (Daugherty et al., 2006).

3.2.1.2. Fairness. Reciprocity (Bensaou, 1997) and justice (Konovsky, 2000) are similar terms for fairness. Managing other partner firms with fairness and justice entails no differentiation among the partners, monitoring of laws and regulations, and assurance of sensible and just profits. The level of cooperation can be affected by reciprocity (fairness) between partners (Kim et al., 2010). Moreover, fairness in a buyer-supplier relationship can be conceptualised within collaborative and long-term SC relationships (Hornibrook, Fearne, & Lazzarin, 2009).

Procedural and distributive justice forms fairness. Supplier behaviour is considered in procedural justice, i.e. treating the partner firm fairly; while distributive justice focuses on reseller outcomes, i.e. costs, risks, and benefits shared among SC members (Griffith et al., 2006; Kumar, Scheer, & Steenkamp, 1995). Procedural justice focuses on decision-making processes and peoples’ attitudes that could be influenced by these determinations (Korsgaard, Schweiger, & Sapienza, 1995). Occasionally interchangeled with incentive alignment, distributive justice (Griffith et al., 2006; Simatupang & Sridharan, 2005), which requires sharing profits and losses with stakeholders fairly, is a crucial aspect of successful partnerships (Cao, Vonderembse et al., 2010). Moreover, effective SCM implies mutual sharing of risks and rewards. Unless the benefits of cooperation exceed costs, a firm will not cooperate (Nassirnia & Robinson, 2013). Distributive justice, namely incentive alignment, ensure satisfactory levels of cooperation (Harland, Zheng, Johnsen, & Lamming, 2004).

3.2.1.3. Mutuality. Based on interdependence and the RDT, mutuality refers to exchange relationships between two organisations in which partners treat and support each other equally in accordance with mutual understanding (Thomson et al., 2009). Mutuality comprises resource sharing, joint knowledge creation, joint problem-solving/ performance measurement, and goal congruence (Kim et al., 2018). Resource sharing involves investing and utilising assets and capabilities with SC partners (Cao et al., 2010). Creating joint knowledge enables promoting a clearer understanding and better reactions to changing markets and environments (Malhotra, Gosain, & Savay, 2005). Common problem-solving implies an amicable settlement of disputes and disagreements among partners (Kumar et al., 2014), which can achieve mutually advanced process improvement. Building cross-functional/original teams and locating each other’s personnel together to solve issues may progress into a virtual integration of SC processes and monitoring, and joint performance measurement can ensure successful collaborative efforts (Lee, Seo, & Dinwoodie, 2016; Min et al., 2005; Seo, Dinwoodie, & Kwak, 2014). Goal congruence applies when objectives are accomplished and satisfied by SC partners, and congruence implies a mutual consensus in company beliefs, practices, values, and features required for SCC (Cao et al., 2010). In addition to the adequate dedication of management time, financial and non-financial investments such as money, training, and technology are crucial for maintaining sustainable collaboration (Min et al., 2005).

3.2.5. Components of ‘extended relationship strength’

3.2.5.1. Trust. Ganesan (1994) defines trust as the extent to which partners view each other as believable with respect to dependability, honouring obligations, and good faith. Trust is recognised as hard to obtain but essential (Fleming et al., 2020). The components of trust are credibility and honesty (Eyuboglu, Ryu, & Tellefsen, 2003), as are reliability and benevolence (Wang, Siu, & Barnes, 2008). Credibility is a company’s cedence of sincerity towards its partner in terms of the fulfilment of promises and obligations (Anderson & Narsu, 1990). Trust can result in reduced costs in relation to prior negotiation, concluding contracts, and subsequent transactions. It can lead to lessening concerns, variability, and reduced transaction costs (Ganesan, 1994; Kwon & Suh, 2005; Wang et al., 2008).

Trust may constrain a partner’s opportunistic behaviour and deter dominant partners from exercising power over fragile partners (Ganesan, 1994). Trust also makes partners believe that long-run idiosyncratic investments can be feasible with minimal risks.
The extent of trust depends on relative power; shippers may trust carriers but are not committed to them because other alternatives are available (Golicic, 2007). If a powerful partner trusts a vulnerable partner, the former is less likely to seek alternative suppliers and will be more tolerant towards short-term inequities (Kumar et al., 1995). However, it is difficult to establish trust, and the other party must prove its ability to solve problems as well as its loyalty (Min et al., 2005).

3.2.5.2. Sustainability. Sustainability continuously strengthens a cooperative relationship with another partner, embedding notions of devotion and a long-term orientation, which extend relationships, thereby stipulating allegiance and long-term expectations (Gardner et al., 1994). A high level of trust and commitment is required to implement SC performance successfully.

Commitment is an indirect or direct promise of continuing a relationship between partners that enables them to tolerate each other’s insufficiencies (within reason) and coordinate rather than taking advantage of the circumstances (Dwyer & Oh, 1987; Min et al., 2005). Organisational commitment within SCs is akin to the weaker party being willing to conduct a long-term relationship, and quality increases with the level of commitment (Nyaga & Whipple, 2011). Long-term orientation indicates the longing of a partner to build a long-term partnership (Ganesan, 1994). Effective SCM requires the creation, continuation, and strengthening of long-term partnerships with SC partners (Kim, Dinwoodie, & Roh, 2020). As partners begin to trust each other because of the success of their collaborative arrangements, collaborative relationships and cooperation are likely to be reinforced (Min et al., 2005).

3.3. Concept construction

Fig. 1 illustrates the construction of cooperation and collaboration in this study. This study postulates that collaboration comprises components that represent cooperation and other components such as trust and sustainability that denote ‘extended relationship strength’. As mentioned above, cooperation comprises sub-constructs such as transparency, fairness, and mutuality, which have their own indicators, and ‘extended relationship strength’ comprises trust and sustainability, which also have their own indicators.

3.4. CCSI definitions

CCSIs are indices based on a survey to measure and intuitively understand the current cooperative and collaborative relationship between shipping lines and shippers.

A measurement of collaboration is required for collaboration performance evaluations (Kumar et al., 2014). The collaboration index allows partners to find desirable collaborative practices (Simatupang & Sridharan, 2005). ‘The index would impart knowledge regarding the depth of collaboration and would assist collaborative alliance in identifying and improving the areas that may need improvement’ (Kumar & Banerjee, 2014, p. 185).

This study develops CCSIs according to types of shipping registered (seagoing and coastal), vessel types or sub-industries of shipping (container, bulk, tanker, and others), and overall CCSIs of the shipping industry of South Korea. The calculation of several different CCSIs is based on the proposition that the shippers would be different according to the sub-industry of shipping; accordingly, the attitudes of distinct shippers towards shipping companies would not be the same. The CCSIs are expected to be able to analyse and assess the overall experiences of shipping companies in relation to shippers. In addition, some policy tasks to improve the relationship between them can be derived.

3.5. Hypothesis development

The types of vessels according to traffic can be grouped into liners, tramps, and specialised vessels. Liners—containers—refer to vessels plying routes between ports at fixed prices regularly, whereas tramps do not have a regular operating schedule (Branch, 2007). Liner shipping operations are analogous to a bus line service and tramp shipping to a taxi service (Windeck & Stadler, 2011). The tramp shipping industry is composed of dry bulk carriers and oil tankers (Thai, Tay, Tan, & Lai, 2014). Thus, broadly speaking, the types of vessels can be divided into containers, bulk, tankers, and others.

The container SC includes various parties in terms of transaction, logistics, and oversight layers, such as the government (Willis & Ortiz, 2004). More specifically, the parties in container SC include buyers and suppliers, logistics service providers, distributors, terminal operators, non-vessel operating common carriers (NVOCCs), freight forwarders, shipping companies, and hinterland transport

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**Fig. 1.** Construction of cooperation and collaboration.
operators. Coordination among multiple players is crucial for overall SC performance (Fransoo & Lee, 2013). As users of logistics services, shippers experience the prices or logistics costs imposed by carriers (Talley & Ng, 2013). Freight forwarders, specialists for less than container load (LCL) containers, most of their revenues are earned from the consolidation of goods and managing customer’s operations (Frémont, 2009). Ocean carriers contract with terminal operators, logistics service providers, hinterland carriers, and shippers (Fransoo & Lee, 2013). Unlike in North America, where shipping lines subcontract with inland transport providers, most shippers and freight forwarders contract with inland transport companies in Europe and Asia (Frémont, 2009; Lin, 2015). Slump bulk trade constitutes a main component of the SC for steel plants, metal producers, aluminium, and agro-food industries (Comtois & Lacoste, 2012). The five main bulk commodities are coal, iron ore, bauxite and alumina, grain, and phosphate rock (UNCTAD, 2016).

Shippers—users of transport services or cargo owners (Stopford, 2009)—can differ because of the complexity of international transport transactions (UNCTAD, 2016) and vessel types. Shippers contract with ocean shipping lines directly or with a third party, such as NVOCCs and logistics service providers, to handle their container shipments by selling reserve spaces to them (Fransoo & Lee, 2013). For full container load (FCL) cargo, both shipping lines and freight forwards have direct relationships with shippers (Frémont, 2008).

Whereas, regarding LCL cargo, freight forwarders act as the main customers of shipping companies by contracting with shippers (Frémont, 2009; Lin, 2015). In the Asia-North America ocean container route, direct contracts between shippers and shipping lines account for approximately 70%, whereas around 70% of contracts belong to the contract between freight forwarders on behalf of shippers and shipping companies in Asia-Europe (Fransoo & Lee, 2013). Thus, freight forwarders and NVOCCs function as de facto shippers to shipping lines. Trade agreement terms such as cost insurance freight between sellers and buyers also determine the shipping company types and vessel types. Shippers contract for less than three months (Frémont, 2008; Fransoo & Lee, 2013). Conversely, regarding LCL cargo, freight forwarders act as the main customers of shipping companies by contracting with shippers (Frémont, 2009; Lin, 2015). For full container load (FCL) cargo, both shipping lines and freight forwards have direct relationships with shippers (Frémont, 2008).

Regarding bulk carriers and tankers, companies in industries such as mining (iron ore, coal, and others), building materials (cement, steel, and others), grain, oil, petroleum, and chemicals, as well as traders are also regarded as tramp shipping shippers (Thai et al., 2014). Fundamental industries such as oil refineries and steel producers sometimes develop their own transport systems (Stopford, 2009), and tramp cargo buyers with their own ports tend to act as shippers and terminal operators (Lin, 2015).

As of late May 2016, there were 183 oceangoing and 723 coastal shipping companies in South Korea (MOF, 2016). The total gross tonnage (GT) and numbers of vessels are listed in Table 1. The number of coastal shipping companies is four times that of oceangoing companies, whereas the total GT of coastal shipping companies is merely 3% of that of the seagoing companies. The average GT and number of vessels per company in the seagoing shipping were 344,181 GT and 8.7, whereas those in the coastal shipping were 2645 GT and 2.9, respectively. Thus, we ascertain that compared to oceangoing shipping, coastal shipping mostly consists of small businesses.

In general, coastal shipping supplies logistics services between domestic ports, whereas oceangoing shipping delivers commodities between domestic and foreign ports or between foreign ports. Differing business scope and sizes imply different kinds of shippers, cooperation, and collaborations, thereby suggesting the following hypothesis:

H1. A difference exists in the extent to which shippers in oceangoing and coastal shipping cooperate and collaborate with their shipping companies.

As mentioned above, over time, shippers have handled different types of cargo, and consequently, various vessels have evolved. Eventually, shippers began contracting with shipping companies possessing specialist vessels. Accordingly, different types of vessels have particular shippers, and idiosyncratic shippers have different attitudes towards shipping companies regarding cooperation and collaboration. Thus, we posit the following hypothesis:

H2. There is a difference in the extent to which shippers of various types of vessels cooperate and collaborate with their shipping companies.

Similarly, contract periods with shippers may vary by vessel type. In liner shipping, direct shippers purchase freight services from container shipping companies typically on a one-year contract, but freight forwarders contract for less than three months (Frémont, 2015; Fransoo & Lee, 2013). Long-term contracts between shippers and shipping companies underpin the tramp shipping of iron ore, forest products, motorcars, and oil and LPG tanker transport (Stopford, 2009), thereby leading to the following hypothesis:

H3. Different contract periods indicate different levels of cooperation and collaboration between shippers and shipping companies.

H4. Different types of vessels combined with different contract periods indicate different levels of cooperation and collaboration between shippers and shipping companies.

These hypotheses were tested by comparing the CCSIs between different shipping types, vessel types, and contract periods.

4. Methods

To reduce human errors and increase content validity in developing questionnaire items, shipping experts’ review, two rounds of Q-sorting, and a pilot test were utilised as follows. After refining the items, 24 questionnaire items overall were distributed for a large-scale survey.

4.1. Development of the measurement instrument

Seventy-six initial items and relevant sub-constructs indicating a cooperative and collaborative spirit were compiled through a literature review. Item listings were emailed to 11 shipping experts with over 20 years of experience in the shipping industry in South Korea. To develop industrially bespoke measures, experts were requested to sort and discard items that were inappropriate or irrelevant to SCs. The sorting yielded 40 items. Finally, after deleting redundant items and merging similar items into a new item with a common meaning, 24 items remained. A qualitative Q-sort technique was employed to ensure transparency, mutuality, and sustainability. The Q-sort technique can be utilized to identify concepts that have not been firmly established in the literature or in developing new scales. Two rounds of Q-sorting of the 24 items and five

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<th>Table 1</th>
<th>Present condition of the shipping industry in South Korea. Source: Adapted from MOF (2016).</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of companies</strong></td>
<td><strong>%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ocean-going</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal</td>
<td>723</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>906</td>
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sub-constructs were conducted with 25 experts in the spring of 2016. The second round demonstrated a solid overall agreement rate of 97%, thereby verifying the existence of the research sub-constructs. Following Q-sorting, pilot testing was conducted and included 3 academics and 31 practitioners representing coastal and oceangoing shipping, container, bulk, tanker, and other ships, and different-sized organisations. Experts were invited to complete all the questions to test for reliability and internal consistency. All scale scores exceeded 0.900, ranging from fairness (=0.919) to mutuality (=0.972) (Kim et al., 2020). Table 2 lists the 24 items obtained through the pilot test. A 7-point Likert scale was used to measure the extent to which managers agreed or disagreed with each item, where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = slightly disagree, 4 = neutral, 5 = slightly agree, 6 = agree, and 7 = strongly agree.

4.2. Data collection

As mentioned in Section 3.5, there are 183 oceangoing and 723 coastal shipping companies in South Korea’s shipping industry (MOF, 2016). Among the coastal shipping companies, private companies were excluded from this study because a private company represents a relatively small portion of GT in coastal shipping. In practice, most of them are small businesses that are almost impossible to contact; it is also considerably difficult to identify whether the companies actually manage their business. Therefore, a census was considered impossible, and the sample was restricted to corporations (420) among all coastal shipping companies (723). In the summer of 2016, 183 oceangoing and 241 coastal shipping companies for which contact information could be acquired were contacted via Korea ship-owners’ associations. Two emails and two telephone reminders produced responses from 89 oceangoing and 85 coastal companies; only 167 of these were usable because one response had missing data, and six showed unengaged attitudes. Only one response per company was collected to avoid biased results. All respondents were restricted to management and staff who were in charge of contracts with shippers. After excluding ineligible and unreachable responses from a sample, the total response rate of this research was 25.5%, and the active response rate was 39.0%. Based on the hypothesis that non-respondents’ views probably mimic those of late respondents, independent-sample t-tests for non-response bias compared the central tendency of 30 early and 30 late responses (Armstrong & Overton, 1977). The outcomes showed that non-response bias for the 24 variables was unlikely (p < 0.05).

Table 3 illustrates the respondents’ representation with various types of shipping, vessels, work experience, roles, and contract period. Moreover, job titles affirmed sufficient knowledge to ensure authoritative responses (Kim et al., 2018).
4.3. Exploratory factor analysis

After the initial judgemental Q-sorting, exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted for further purification by utilising maximum likelihood (ML) and direct oblimin (DO). A principal component analysis enables data reduction but fails to distinguish between shared and unique variance and may inflate the estimates of the variance explained by factors, thereby frustrating generalisation. ML is less problematic and maintains consistency with confirmatory factor analysis tested by AMOS. Further, oblique rotation was selected because a certain factor inter-correlation is common in social sciences (Costello & Osborne, 2005; Pedhazur & Schmelkin, 2013).

The EFA of 16 items presumed to represent cooperation detected no cross-loadings, but one free-standing indicator variable (Table 4: MUT2) was deleted. The ratio of observations to variables (167:16) was acceptable (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2014). Bartlett’s test results were highly significant ($\chi^2 = 2868.796$, $df = 105$, $p = 0.000$); the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling accuracy scores (0.945) revealed that the EFA was appropriate. Furthermore, variables with factor loadings exceeding 0.45 were selected as the sample size, and all variable communalities exceeded 0.5 (Hair et al., 2014). Three factors were selected for analysis, each with eigenvalues exceeding 0.7; together, these explained 82.5% of the total variance. Variables MUT1 to MUT8 loaded highly on Factor 1, and Factor 2 was characterised by variables FAI1 to FAI4, while Factor 3 had four distinctive characteristics (TRA1 to TRA 4). Items with sufficient factor loadings on the same factor indicated mutuality (Factor 1), fairness (Factor 2), and transparency (Factor 3).

The EFA of 24 items initially indicating collaboration yielded no cross-loadings, but two free-standing items (Table 5: MUT2 and SUS1) were eliminated. A 7:1 ratio of observations to variables was acceptable. For the remaining 22 items, the adequacy of EFA was identified using the KMO measure (0.944) and Bartlett’s test ($\chi^2 = 4195.77$, $df = 231$, $p = 0.000$). Five common factors with initial eigenvalues exceeding 0.7 explained 83.3% of the total variance.

4.4. Confirmatory factor analysis

Validity and reliability methods using a two-step SEM procedure were used to test the measurement accuracy (Hair et al., 2014). For cooperation, the overall model indicated a good fit; $\chi^2 = 273.066$, (87 degrees of freedom $[df]$, $p = 0.000$). Given that $n = 167$, the standardised root mean squared residual (SRMR, 0.0395) was an appropriate absolute fit index with significance < 0.05, which is a conservative threshold. The comparative fit index (CFI, 0.935) and Tucker-Lewis index (TLI, 0.922) both exceeded the critical values (> 0.90). Regarding convergent validity, all standardised factor loadings were > 0.7 and corresponding squared factor loadings > 0.5. TRA2 had the lowest factor loading of 0.752, and its squared factor loading was 0.566. The values and statistical significance of the critical ratio implied that all factor loadings were reasonable and statistically significant ($p < 0.01$). The average variance extracted (AVE) estimates ranged from 0.745 (transparency) to 0.779 (mutuality), exceeding the critical threshold of 0.5 (Hair et al., 2014). Composite reliabilities (CR) between 0.921 (transparency) and 0.961 (mutuality) represented adequate reliability (> 0.7; Hair et al., 2014). In all cases, the value of Cronbach’s $\alpha$ exceeded 0.7. The overall model fit indices for the cooperation measurement model supported convergent validity and discriminant validity, given that all square roots of AVE estimates exceeded the corresponding pairwise correlation estimates among the sub-constructs.

Furthermore, the measurement model for collaboration includes 22 measured indicator variables and 5 latent variables, with the sub-construct of trust represented by four items and that of sustainability by three. The overall model fit was good ($\chi^2 = 507.879$, $df = 199$; RMR = 0.0426 [$p < 0.05$]; TLI = 0.914; CFI = 0.926). Regarding convergent validity, all standardised factor loadings were > 0.7, and the corresponding squared multiple correlations were > 0.5. Item TRA2 had the lowest factor loading (0.754) and squared multiple correlation (0.568). All factor loadings were reasonable and statistically significant ($p < 0.01$). All AVE estimates (0.746–0.814) were > 0.5. The CRs ranged from 0.914 to 0.961 and Cronbach’s $\alpha$
from 0.914 to 0.960, exceeding the minimum criterion (0.7). In addition, measures taken overall strongly supported the convergent validity of the measurement model for collaboration and discriminant validity. All correlations among sub-constructs that explained collaboration were significant \((p < 0.01)\), and all values of square roots of AVEs exceeded the corresponding pairwise correlations among the sub-constructs (Kim et al., 2018). For a better understanding, the thresholds of model fit and criteria for construct validity are provided in the appendices.

The target coefficient (T-coefficient) assessed the efficiency of the second-order factor model. The T-coefficient \((T)\) is the relative ratio of \(\chi^2\) in the first-order and second-order models, where \(T \geq 0.8\), a second-order construct exists, and the second-order structure is efficient (Cao & Zhang, 2010). Cooperation was measured indirectly using first-order factor indicators that load on the second-order factor. Further, standardised factor loadings of measurement items on respective first-order factors \((0.75–0.96)\) were all significant \((p < 0.01)\). The standardised factor loadings of first-order factors on second-order factors \((0.90–0.93)\) and strong paths demonstrated statistical significance \((p < 0.01)\), explaining 81% (transparency), 87% (fairness), and 81% (mutuality) of the variation in the second-order construct. The T-coefficient between the first- and second-order factor models was 1, which shows good evidence of the existence of a higher-order construct—cooperation. The estimates were strong and significant \((p < 0.01)\) in testing the existence and efficiency of the collaboration second-order factor model. The second-order factor explained 76% of the variation in transparency, 68% of sustainability, 72% of trust, 85% of mutuality, and 86% of fairness. The model fit indices satisfied the recommended thresholds. The T-value (0.967) indicated that an efficient and valid second-factor model and first-order factors were sufficiently explained by the second-order construct—collaboration (Kim et al., 2018).

A comparison of the three models identified the possibility of common method bias, convergent validity, and discriminant validity. Significant \(\Delta \chi^2\) statistics (regarding collaboration, \(\Delta \chi^2 (22) = 3184.7\), \(p < 0.01\)) between the null and one-factor models, \(\Delta \chi^2 (5) = 702.9\),

### Table 5
EFA result for collaboration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
<th>Factor 3</th>
<th>Factor 4</th>
<th>Factor 5</th>
<th>Communality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FAI3</td>
<td>0.703</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAI4</td>
<td>0.576</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAI1</td>
<td>0.523</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAI2</td>
<td>0.496</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUS3</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.861</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUS4</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.774</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUS2</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.541</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUT6</td>
<td>-0.969</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUT5</td>
<td>-0.848</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUT3</td>
<td>-0.787</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUT7</td>
<td>-0.785</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUT4</td>
<td>-0.717</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUT8</td>
<td>-0.683</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUT1</td>
<td>-0.585</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRA3</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.841</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRA2</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.777</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRA4</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.646</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRU3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRU4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.672</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eigenvalues</td>
<td>14.263</td>
<td>1.354</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>0.877</td>
<td>0.725</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Variance</td>
<td>64.83</td>
<td>6.154</td>
<td>5.024</td>
<td>3.987</td>
<td>3.296</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative %</td>
<td>64.83</td>
<td>70.985</td>
<td>76.009</td>
<td>79.966</td>
<td>83.291</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 6
Comparison of the model fit.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Null (M0)</th>
<th>Cooperation</th>
<th>Collaboration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(\chi^2)</td>
<td>DF</td>
<td>SRMR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2973.2</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>0.6335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One factor (M1)</td>
<td>(\chi^2)</td>
<td>DF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>633.0</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>0.0679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M0–M1</td>
<td>(\chi^2)</td>
<td>DF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2340.2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.0395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second order factor (M2)</td>
<td>(\chi^2)</td>
<td>DF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>273.0</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>0.0395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M1–M2</td>
<td>(\chi^2)</td>
<td>DF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>360.0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.0395</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. ****: significant at the 0.001 significance level, SI: Significantly Improved.
The possibility of joint effects and the main effects of vessel types and contract periods on CCSIs were examined. Following Box’s test (significance = 0.120), a null hypothesis of equality of variance-covariance matrices was accepted (p < 0.05). Levene’s test for CCSIs showed non-significant values (cooperation = 0.815; collaboration = 0.974). Multivariate and univariate tests indicated compliance with the assumptions of homoscedasticity. Further, multivariate statistics suggest an insignificant interaction effect between vessel type and contract period (PT V = 0.065, F (4, 306) = 0.735, p < 0.738, n² = 0.033, P (power) = 0.469), thereby implying a rejection of H4. Hence, direct effects were examined without adjustment. In addition, multivariate testing with different group sizes using PT demonstrated significant effects of contract periods and vessel types on CCSIs (for the contract period, V = 0.129, F (6, 306) = 3.512, p (0.002) < 0.01, n² = 0.048; for vessel types, V = 0.081, F (6, 306) = 2.166, p (0.046) < 0.05, n² = 0.41, P (power) = 0.767). The power measures are good for contract periods and acceptable for vessel types, thereby supporting H2 and H3. The values of n² imply that contract periods have a greater effect on CCSIs than vessel types. Similarly, follow-up univariate analyses of variance (ANOVAs) on dependent variables revealed significant effects of contract periods and vessel types on CCSIs. The following are the CSIs results: contract periods, F (13, 153) = 6.234, p < 0.01; vessel types, F (13, 153) = 2.880, p < 0.05. The results for CSIs were as follows: contract periods with F (13, 153) = 6.872, p < 0.01; vessel types with F (13, 153) = 2.839, p < 0.05. Tests of ‘between-subjects effects’ generated p-values that indicate significant differences between groups regarding contract periods and vessel types, thereby implying that the CCSIs are significantly affected.

4.6.2. Differences among vessel types and contract periods

Finally, the index is scaled from 0 to 100, thereby enabling the computation of a cooperative spirit index (CSI = 55.0) and collaborative spirit index (CSI = 57.0; Table 10).

### 4.6. Comparison of differences in cooperative and collaborative spirit indices

#### 4.6.1. Differences between types of shipping registered

Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was deployed to examine differences in the groupings of CCSIs. In testing H1, a cursory inspection revealed higher CCSIs for coastal shipping. The assumption of independence between observations underpinning MANOVA were met through saturation sampling. Multivariate normality was attained because no higher-order moments of dependent variables differed significantly from normality (p < 0.05) identified by z-values < 1.96 for skewness (CSI1 = 0.665; CSI2 = 1.165) or kurtosis (CSI1 = −0.909; CSI2 = −1.168). CCSIs both separately and collectively meet homoscedasticity assumptions, as both Levene’s test (CSI1, p = 0.534; CSI2, p = 0.140) and Box’s test (p = 0.158) are insignificant at p < 0.05. Further, Bartlett’s sphericity test indicates a significant correlation (p = 0.000) between dependent variables (Hair et al., 2014). No multivariate test statistic showed a significant difference between the coastal and oceangoing shipping companies (p < 0.05). The following are the main effects and power statistics for Pillai’s trace (PT): V (value) = 0.027, F (2, 164) = 2.245, p (0.109) > 0.1, n² = 0.027, P (power) = 0.452. The univariate tests for each dependent variable indicated no significant difference (p = 0.117 for cooperation, p = 0.240 for collaboration), and a post-hoc test was inappropriate with only two groups (Hair et al., 2014). Consequently, H1 is rejected.

#### 4.6.2. Differences among vessel types and contract periods

The possibility of joint effects and the main effects of vessel types and contract periods on CCSIs were examined. Following Box’s test (significance = 0.120), a null hypothesis of equality of variance-covariance matrices was accepted (p < 0.05). Levene’s test for CCSIs showed non-significant values (cooperation = 0.815; collaboration = 0.974). Multivariate and univariate tests indicated compliance with the assumptions of homoscedasticity. Further, multivariate statistics suggest an insignificant interaction effect between vessel type and contract period (PT V = 0.065, F (4, 306) = 0.735, p < 0.738, n² = 0.033, P (power) = 0.469), thereby implying a rejection of H4. Hence, direct effects were examined without adjustment. In addition, multivariate testing with different group sizes using PT demonstrated significant effects of contract periods and vessel types on CCSIs (for the contract period, V = 0.129, F (6, 306) = 3.512, p (0.002) < 0.01, n² = 0.048; for vessel types, V = 0.081, F (6, 306) = 2.166, p (0.046) < 0.05, n² = 0.41, P (power) = 0.767). The power measures are good for contract periods and acceptable for vessel types, thereby supporting H2 and H3. The values of n² imply that contract periods have a greater effect on CCSIs than vessel types. Similarly, follow-up univariate analyses of variance (ANOVAs) on dependent variables revealed significant effects of contract periods and vessel types on CCSIs. The following are the CSIs results: contract periods, F (13, 153) = 6.234, p < 0.01; vessel types, F (13, 153) = 2.880, p < 0.05. The results for CSIs were as follows: contract periods with F (13, 153) = 6.872, p < 0.01; vessel types with F (13, 153) = 2.839, p < 0.05. Tests of ‘between-subjects effects’ generated p-values that indicate significant differences between groups regarding contract periods and vessel types, thereby implying that the CCSIs are significantly affected.

#### Post-hoc tests were applied to compare CCSIs grouped by contract period and vessel type (Table 9). According to Tukey’s LSD test, in terms of contract periods for CSI1, the ‘less than 1 year’ group showed a significant difference from the ‘3–9 years’ (p = 0.003) and ‘more than 10 years’ (p = 0.000) groups at the 0.01 significance level.
The '1–2 years' group showed significant discrimination with the 'more than 10 years' group \((p = 0.013)\). The effect of contract periods on CSI2 demonstrated the same pattern as that of CSI1.

By vessel type, only 'container' was significantly different from 'other groups' at the 0.05 significance level \((p = 0.014)\) for CSI1. The difference between 'bulk' and 'others' was marginally significant \((p = 0.056)\). No other significant differences were detected. For CSI2, the difference between 'container' and 'others' also showed a marginal significance \((p = 0.058)\). No other differences in vessel types in CSI2 were revealed.

### 5. Findings and discussion

Table 10 illustrates the CCSIs computed by shipping registered, vessel types, and contract periods. Indices for coastal shipping exceed those for oceangoing shipping. By vessel type, the indices for 'other' ships exceed those for tankers, bulks, and containers. In terms of contract periods, longer contracts show higher CCSIs.

The cooperation and collaboration between SC members represent a CSI1 of 55 and a CSI2 of 57. According to CCSIs by shipping types registered, it appears that coastal shipping companies (CSI1 = 58 and CSI2 = 59) regard their powerful SC partners as having more cooperative and collaborative attitudes than oceangoing shipping companies (CSI1 = 53, CSI2 = 56). Although it appears that there is a difference between the two types of shipping companies, the difference is not supported by the empirical test, MANOVA, rejecting Hypothesis 1. In other words, it is revealed that Korean shipping companies, regardless of the types of shipping registered, consider the cooperative and collaborative attitudes of their shippers as not high.

Meanwhile, the MANOVA demonstrated statistically significant differences among the CCSIs in terms of vessel types and contract period groups.
periods. Thus, Hypotheses 2 and 3 are accepted. The joint effects of vessel types and contract periods do not indicate any significant differences, leading us to reject Hypothesis 4. Nevertheless, as the contract period increases, the CCSIs of vessel types grow steadily, which shows that CCSIs of vessel types can be closely related to those of the contract period. The differences between container (CSI = 48 and CSI = 52) and others (CSI = 61 and CSI = 62) among vessel types are the most distinctive. More long-term contracts represent higher CCSIs. The differences in CCSIs are noticeable between contract periods of ‘less than 1’ and ‘over 3 years’.

Although vessel types and contract periods have a relatively close relationship and each shows a significant difference in terms of CCSIs, it is more rational to consider the contract period as affecting CCSIs more closely and consistently than types of vessels. In other words, the contract period, regardless of vessel type, indicates a consistent trend of CCSIs, whereas vessel type considering the contract period concurrently do not show a coherent tendency as much as the contract period. This can be explained by the fact that most container shipping companies unquestionably have short-term contracts with shippers, whereas bulk and tanker carriers show mixed contracts—both short-and long-term contracts.

Further, it can also be more reasonable to deem that although the contract period clearly and coherently affects CCSIs of different kinds of vessels, the contract period is only one of several elements that can affect the CSI by vessel type. Other elements, such as various characteristics of different shippers, can explain the different CCSIs according to the vessel type.

CCSIs quantify the state of SC cooperation and collaboration and can suggest improvement strategies. On both CSI1 and CSI2, mutuality (50) and fairness (56) components recorded lower factor scores than transparency (58), although trust (65) increased the overall score of CSI2 to 57, two points above CSI1 (Table 11).

The lowest scores of mutuality reveal that shipping companies perceive little financial support or assistance from shippers to overcome difficulties, and common implementation of planning and performance reviews rarely succeeded, thereby implying fundamentally weak exchange relationships in SCs.

Fairness—one of the important components of cooperation and collaboration—represents the second lowest score among the CSI components. Distributive fairness is deemed less applicable than procedural fairness, as shipping companies regard the reasonable and just sharing of profits and burdens with powerful shippers as insufficient. Further, low attitude scores of dominant partners towards dividing gains and costs decrease satisfaction amongst shipping companies (Harland et al., 2004) and hinder the building of trust and true cooperation between SC members.

Low sustainability scores imply that influential members belittle ‘relationship extendedness’, which involves the joint development of new business plans or expanding new markets. Hence, the findings show that shipping companies cannot be fully confident of extended relationships with their partners.

Transparency, such as information sharing and frequent contact in the SC, is considered relatively good. However, limited open and two-way communication reflects the superior power of shippers.

Moreover, despite relatively low CCSI scores, weaker SC members show comparatively strong trust towards superior partners. This is because shipping companies firmly believe in the fulfilment of the contractual obligations of shippers, with regulations concerning business transactions and laws governing fair trade being passably well observed by powerful members.

Overall, it is possible to evaluate cooperation and collaboration as being at extremely modest levels. The lack of spirit of mutuality, distributive fairness, ‘relationship extendedness’, and two-way communication negatively influence the construction of higher levels of cooperative and collaborative relationships between the SC members.

6. Conclusion

6.1. Contributions to theories

This research supports findings from the TCT that benign and credible transactions are realistic (Heaver, 2015), as inter-firm cooperation decreases transaction costs and realises mutual gains. In addition, shipper superiority coupled with modest CCSIs imply that market or ‘muscular’ transactions predominate. However, long-term contracts and correspondingly higher CCSIs indicate ‘benign’ and ‘credible’ transactions as hybrid forms of transactional governance.

From the perspective of the RBT, SC cooperation and collaboration are intangible resources and capabilities that build sustainable competitive advantage. Shipping companies with higher CCSIs can gain a competitive advantage because vulnerable members are revenue-dependent on shippers, and cooperation and collaboration benefits accumulate over time.

Within the RDT, resource exchanges shape inter-firm relationships driven by power relations (Ulrich & Barney, 1984). Firms capable of reducing others’ power over themselves, in turn, escalate their power over others (Hillman et al., 2009). This perspective of RDT may partially explain the attitudes of dominant SC members because shippers need to cooperate and collaborate with shipping companies in resources and services and simultaneously switch carriers in a competitive industry (Golicic, 2007). CSI scores by vessel type highlight shippers’ ability to exert power efficiently over weaker SC members. Low CCSIs for containers indicate that shippers have effectively reduced the power shipping lines wielded over them and their dependence on shipping lines.

SET informs the research conceptual model regarding fairness, commitment (Korsgaard et al., 1995), and long-term orientation (Griffith et al., 2006). A highly significant path coefficient for fairness indicates that weaker SC members regard fairness as the pivotal antecedent of trust. Further, SEM supports the proposition that trust has a direct and positive influence on sustainability, which comprises the concepts of commitment and long-term orientation (Kim et al., 2018). Thus, the essential concepts of SET within the context of maritime logistics and relationships among the concepts are strongly supported.

Further, CCSIs can provide a criterion to define the type of relations in SCs and the extent of goodwill. Low CCSIs in container shipping can imply widespread market or hierarchical relations and insufficient or unsatisfactory goodwill from shippers towards shipping.

This research assists in the operationalisation of key concepts. Golicic et al. (2003) and Speckman et al. (1998) differentiate cooperation from collaboration—collaboration comprises cooperation and ‘extended relationship strength’, which includes trust and sustainability. Furthermore, first-order factors comprising a few

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Table 11
Overall CCSIs and factor score.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Transparency</th>
<th>Fairness</th>
<th>Mutuality</th>
<th>Trust</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
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<tr>
<td>CSI1</td>
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concepts are utilised to measure cooperation and collaboration. Despite representing construct composite factors, first-order factors clearly represent and measure the higher-order factors of cooperation and collaboration. Fairness extends beyond ‘incentive alignment’, which represents distributive fairness. Both procedural fairness and distributive justice in building cooperative relationships are adopted simultaneously (Kim et al., 2018).

6.2. Managerial implications

CCSIs reveal that indifference towards mutuality, distributive fairness, ‘relationship extendedness’, and two-way communication hamper cooperative and collaborative SCs. The failure of shipping companies also damages SC members, as evidenced by the Hanjin Shipping Company’s bankruptcy in 2016. A total of 329 shippers lost USD 120 M and suffered delivery delays, dishonoured contracts, resources squandered in finding capable transport service providers, and rising freight rates (Aydin & Kamal, 2021; Kamal & Aydin, 2021; KITA, 2017; Song, Seo, & Kwak, 2019). Orderly maintenance of cooperation and collaboration with weaker SC members serves the long-run self-interests of powerful SC members, and emergency financial support to hard-pressed shipping companies preserves service provision.

Further, two-way communication between influential and weaker SC members is necessary to establish common cooperative and collaborative implementation plans and review performance jointly. Shippers’ endeavours to ensure rationalised and justified contact enhance SC exchange relationships. However, shippers must also avoid overly frequent contact, which can be burdensome to vulnerable partners (Kim et al., 2018; Min et al., 2005).

Shipping companies value fairness most highly in building trust and expect greater distributive fairness from influential SC members (Kim et al., 2018). Moreover, stable, effective channel partnerships with unfair suppliers are unlikely (Kumar et al., 1995).

Shipper-shipping company relationships effectively illustrate the SC relationships. Mutual sharing of profits and burdens between stronger and weaker members develops effective, high-quality relationships and mutual trust, which precedes partnership building. Expectations of reciprocal provision pre-dispose partners to accept short-term hardships, as long-run attitudes of sharing benefits and burdens aid both partners (Gardner et al., 1994). Long-term SC relationships generate improved quality and reduced costs. The reinforcement of long-term relationships with superior members may ensure survival for weaker partners or stable foundations for long-term growth, perhaps through joint expansion of new markets and corporate development of new business plans.

Establishing trust requires sufficient cooperation, and weaker members must develop and implement complex and time-consuming methods to build trust with influential SC partners (Daugherty et al., 2006; Min et al., 2005). Shipping companies must keep delivery promises and satisfy shippers’ expectations continuously. Ship-owners must empathise with shippers by offering flexible and responsive innovative value-added services, including integrated logistics services. In addition, to build ‘brand loyalty’, shipping companies must continuously support the needs of their superior partners (Kim et al., 2018).

6.3. Policy implications

Power imbalances coupled with adversarial relationships, perhaps between shippers and carriers, invite government intervention to foster inter-organisational cooperation through the public governance of an association (Fugate et al., 2005). Shipping operates within complex patterns of agreements that involve shipping companies, shippers and government policies, mediation, and ‘order-preserving mechanisms’ to maintain cooperation as contracts are enacted (Williamson, 2008).

Sporadic two-way communication within SCs and shippers’ dominance may necessitate government intervention to create consultative stakeholder groups to increase cooperative relationships. For instance, in 2010, the Federal Maritime Commission organised voluntary committees to address commercial practices, capacity forecasting, and enhanced collaborative relationships between shippers and carriers (Heaver, 2015). Low CCSIs make liner shipping a prime initial candidate. In parallel, the government must take action to collate, provide, and disseminate best practices of cooperation and collaboration to improve process efficiency, flexibility, business synergy, quality, and innovation (Cao & Zhang, 2010, 2011; Cao et al., 2010), especially where firms misunderstand collaboration and shun formal arrangements (Barratt, 2004). Good practices can be found in ‘other vessels’ (tugs, barges, and reefer), which record high CCSIs, and the two-fifths of the bulk and tanker sectors with contract periods exceeding three years, thereby allowing sufficient time to develop good practice. The exemplar practice of mutuality and sustainability relates to how common plans are established, performance is jointly measured, and assistance is offered. The development of ‘relationship extendedness’ by jointly developing new business models and expanding new markets is instructive, as are long-term contract periods, which signify close relationships. Further, detailed execution plans to enhance CCSIs impact logistics, network design, and strategic plans to generate mutual benefits.

To enhance CCSIs, governments must consider institutional strategies to promote fairness as a key component of cooperation and an essential antecedent of trust. Under global competition and heightened uncertainties, government policies and regulatory regimes can encourage new collaborative relationships among international logistics parties to improve efficiency (Heaver, 2015). Interventions can be undertaken to reinforce distribution fairness, such as limiting driver working hours, muffle opportunistic tendencies by shippers, and encourage more collaborative attitudes towards weaker SC members (Fugate et al., 2009).

6.4. Limitations and recommendations for future research

CCSIs diagnose, compare, and evaluate the current state of cooperation and collaboration between SC members. However, as the composite indicator is exploratory (Cao & Zhang, 2010), its limitations indicate recommendations for future research. A detailed taxonomy of shippers as suppliers, manufacturers, distributors, large retailers, and freight forwarders might facilitate more accurate evaluations of CCSIs by shipper type. In this study, CCSIs reporting by vessel type assumes that shippers are differentiated within each type, thereby denying a direct link between CCSIs and shippers. A more detailed categorisation would enable the creation of such linkages.

This study highlights the shipping firm’s perspective and uses a single informant design, which can lead to common methods variance (Griffith et al., 2006). The views of influential SC members differ from those of weaker partners; future research must consider both sides (Kim et al., 2018).

Can CCSIs be generalised to embrace other SC relationships? The research methods presented are transferable to test other relationships spanning combinations of SC members. Nevertheless, each is distinctive, and research requires advice from expert commentators regarding relevant items. In this research, joint demand forecasts and inventory management between shippers and shipping companies were eschewed; however, suppliers and manufacturers or manufacturers and distributors may embrace them.

International comparisons of CCSIs are desirable; nonetheless, there are social, cultural, and legal variations. Where regulations and
contract forms concerning business transactions vary, interviews with shipping experts are required to propose comparable international measurement items; where comparability is attained, each country can identify strengths, weaknesses, and remedial measures to enhance its performance. The data of this study were collected in 2016, which could be viewed as a limitation. However, except for a few unusual cases such as the recent COVID-19 pandemic, shippers always had the upper hand in the relationship between the shipping lines. This study can provide valuable insight by conducting a longitudinal study when the shipping cycle is favorable to shippers.

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Declaration of Competing Interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

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